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Abstract:
The primary goal of this chapter is to present a new method—called Logical Argument 
Mapping (LAM)—for the analysis of framing processes. To justify this approach, I start 
with a distinction between boundary setting, sensemaking, and meaning construction as 
three forms or aspects of framing, and argue that crucial for the resolution of frame-
based controversies is our ability to deal with entire “webs” of mutually supporting be-
liefs. LAM allows us to visualize the inferential structure of those webs of belief in a 
holistic manner. The method is introduced by means of an exemplary analysis of two 
conflicting interpretations of how the international community should deal with Hamas 
after its election victory in 2006. 
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Introduction
Based on a long debate on “framing” in areas like communication theory, conflict re-
search, and policy studies we know that an understanding of framing processes is cru-
cial when it comes to problems like communication; social, cultural, and political inter-
action; deliberation; and the resolution of conflicts and controversies. Whenever we try 
to understand something or talk to each other, framing is involved in one way or anoth-
er.
The term “framing” can be used to describe three different, but obviously interrelated 
processes: (a) the process of constructing meaning by using language, or by producing 
signs, in order to induce certain interpretations of events, facts, or utterances in an audi-
ence; (b) the process of interpretation itself, that is “framing” as a cognitive process that 
we perform all the time to make sense of what is going on around us; and (c) the pro-
cess of setting boundaries around an issue, that is a process which comes closest to the 
literal meaning of “frame” as something that surrounds something else, say a painting or 
a mirror. In order to keep things clear for the following discussion, I will use the follow-
ing terms to distinguish these three processes:
a) “meaning construction” to describe a semiotic process of framing (“semiotic” in 
the sense of producing signs, including language, gesture and body language, 
mimics, prosody, etc.; exemplary for this sense of framing are the approaches of 
Bateson, 1972 <1955>, and Lakoff, 2002);
b) “sensemaking” to describe the cognitive process of interpreting and understand-
ing (see Minsky, 1997 <1974>); and
c) “boundary setting” to describe mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion (see Ul-
rich, 2001, and Ulrich, 2003, on “boundary judgments”).
A first objective of this chapter is to define meaning construction, sensemaking, and 
boundary setting more clearly so that we can answer the question whether these pro-
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cesses can be taken as different forms of framing that could exist independently of each 
other, or as different aspects of one and the same process of framing. In this context, I 
will argue that, while meaning construction and boundary setting are processes that we 
can set deliberately and strategically into play, sensemaking is a process that is so basic 
for all our cognition that the hardest challenge for controversies that are determined by 
incommensurable sensemaking mechanisms is to get access to those mechanisms. This 
challenge  has  best  been described by Donald Schön and Martin  Rein  in their  book 
Frame Reflection:  “How can we possibly resolve frame conflicts when frames them-
selves determine what counts as evidence and what interpretations of evidence are ac-
ceptable?” (Schön & Rein, 1994, p. 41).
Schön and Rein presuppose that there must be a basis on which “frame conflicts are re-
solvable ... through frame-reflective policy inquiry”; there  must be “an objective basis 
for choosing among frames,” because otherwise “we are caught in the predicament of 
epistemological relativism. We must then reluctantly concede that we have no reason-
able basis for deciding among policy frames, all of which may be internally consistent 
and compelling in their own terms and, hence, equally worthy of choice” (ibid.). This 
argument, however, is hardly convincing. It is like claiming “God must exist, because 
otherwise life has no purpose and meaning.” Neither the existence of God nor the exis-
tence of an “objective basis” for the evaluation of frames can be proved by the fact that 
it would be hard to live with the consequences if it were otherwise. The question wheth-
er we are forced to live with epistemological relativism will be decided, I fear to say, 
only by our answer to the question whether it is possible at all to justify any evaluation 
basis as objective. Chances, however, are slim. The main argument for being skeptical 
at this point has been provided by Schön and Rein themselves when they correctly hint 
at the fact that there is no “frame-neutrality”; there is no view from nowhere, and this is 
true also for those who are not personally involved in an issue, who are “only” observ-
ers:
there is a generic, theoretical difficulty that does not yield in any obvious way to care-
ful methods of observation and analysis. Frames must be constructed by someone, and 
those who construct frames (the authors of this book, for example) do not do so from 
positions of unassailable frame-neutrality. They bring their own frames to the enter-
prise and, what is more, they may be unaware of doing so. (Schön & Rein, 1994, p. 36)
This, indeed, is the deepest dilemma for those working on the question of how commu-
nication, interaction, and the resolution of conflicts and controversies might be possible 
when failures of mutual understanding are caused by incommensurable sensemaking 
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mechanisms. On the one hand, we know how sensemaking mechanisms work in princi-
ple, but since we know as well that they are a universal, inevitable phenomenon, we 
have to concede, on the other hand, that any concrete reconstruction and analysis of 
framing processes is itself determined and constrained by the very same mechanisms it 
attempts to describe—only on a different level.
The main objective of this chapter—after clarifying the processes of meaning construc-
tion, sensemaking,  and boundary setting as three  forms or  aspects of framing—is to 
present a method for the analysis of framing processes that is designed to cope with the 
problem of missing frame-neutrality on the analyst’s side as far as it is possible. In the 
literature  on framing,  the most  differentiated  instrument  for the  analysis of  framing 
seems to be the typology of frames developed by Barbara Gray in several publications 
(Gray, 2003, 2006, 2007). Gray distinguishes, for example, a series of different “con-
flict management frames” that become visible in the ways stakeholders try to deal with 
a conflict; “power frames” that describe how parties perceive and create social and mor-
al authorities, roles, and the distribution of resources; “social control frames” that refer 
to disputants’ expectations about how decisions in society will be made; “whole story 
frames” that sum up the essence of a conflict in a few sentences; “identity frames” and 
“characterization frames” by which we describe ourselves and others; and frames on 
how to deal with risks, and gains versus losses. 
The main idea of Gray’s approach is that a “frame analysis” that is based on such a ty-
pology of frames can both improve our understanding of what is going on in a conflict, 
and “can also create opportunities for reframing or for frame enlargement among the 
parties—processes which may increase civil dialogue among them and increase possi-
bilities for collaborative action.” Those “frame-based interventions” include: “(1) self-
reflective frame exploration, (2) perspective taking exercises that encourage disputants 
to begin to hear (without judgment) the ways other disputants experience the conflict, 
and (3) rewriting of stereotypes” (Gray, 2007). Additionally, such a frame analysis can 
help us to distinguish those aspects of a conflict that are negotiable and those that are 
not (Campbell & Docherty, 2006).
Compared to Gray’s approach to frame analysis, my suggestion for a method to analyze 
framing processes is very different. Based on the distinction between meaning construc-
tion, sensemaking, and boundary setting, and based on the thesis—which I elaborate in 
the first section—that the crucial point for the resolution of frame-based controversies is 
our ability to deal with entire “webs” of mutually supporting beliefs, my approach is 
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more holistic. Instead of identifying and separating frames by means of a given typolo-
gy, I am focusing on the visualization of the argumentative structure of stakeholders’ 
positions as a whole.  The basic idea is the following: If sensemaking processes that 
form the cognitive basis of understanding are determined by webs of mutually support-
ing beliefs, then a substantial change of mind (“reframing”) is only possible when the 
whole web is addressed. Since “mutually supporting” regarding beliefs can be translated 
into the assumption that there is an inferential structure between those beliefs, the best 
way to represent those webs of beliefs should be to present them as networks of mutual-
ly supporting arguments. However, since those networks can be very complex, we need 
special methods to visualize their structure. For this reason, the method I am proposing 
for the analysis of framing processes focuses on the graphical construction of argument 
maps. The inferential structure of such a map would then be the glue that holds frames 
together.
The method I am proposing is called Logical Argument Mapping (LAM). It has origi-
nally been developed as a tool to induce cognitive change in stakeholders who partici-
pate in facilitated conflict negotiations (Hoffmann, 2005). While LAM has been used in 
this initial approach as an intervention tool, the focus here is on using it as an analytical 
tool. My goal is to show that the method can be used for the analysis of framing pro-
cesses as they are visible in texts, narratives, and communication. 
With regard to both these possible applications of Logical Argument Mapping, three 
considerations are crucial: first, that visualizing what we think about an issue helps us to 
reflect on our own thinking; second, that the best way to represent entire “webs” of mu-
tually supporting beliefs is to present them as networks of mutually supporting argu-
ments, that is as an argument map with an inferential structure; and third, that imposing 
the normative standard of logical validity on the construction of argument maps helps 
us  (a)  to  distinguish  complete  from incomplete  reconstructions;  (b)  to  evaluate  the 
soundness and strength of arguments; and (c) challenges us to criticize and improve our 
own thinking as long as it takes to create the best possible argument. 
This last point leads us back to the problem of frame-neutrality. Although there is, of 
course, no guarantee that a logical consistent representation of a framing process that an 
analyst constructs is adequate, true, objective, or not biased by this analyst’s own fram-
ing processes, imposing logical consistency as a normative standard that must be ful-
filled in any reconstruction of an argumentation has at least two advantages. The first 
one is that it prevents premature simplifications, motivates a complete reconstruction of 
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a position, and fulfills thus a minimal requirement of fairness. The reason for that is that 
a logical reconstruction of an argument forces us to add premises that are not explicitly 
stated, mostly those premises—called “warrants”—that we need in order to justify that 
a reason somebody provides for a claim is indeed sufficient to make this claim a neces-
sary conclusion. For example, if someone offers the proposition p as a reason for q, this 
simple argument can easily be transformed into a logically valid argument by adding 
the premise “if  p, then q.” Making this warrant explicit in an argument reconstruction 
creates not only a much stronger argument, but visualizes at the same time a new chal-
lenge: We see now that it might not only be necessary to defend our reasons by further 
arguments, but also the warrants which are usually more important since they are for-
mulated as universal statements. Based on the need to defend those reasons and war-
rants, the analyst is forced to reconstruct not only an argument, but an entire argumenta-
tion—defined here as a set of mutually supporting arguments—as completely as possi-
ble.
The second advantage of establishing logical validity as normative standard for argu-
ment mapping is linked to the first one. Since nobody would propose a certain reason p 
for a certain claim q without implicitly assuming that p is indeed a sufficient reason for 
q, visualizing a warrant like “if p, then q” means visualizing a part of the arguer’s im-
plicit beliefs. Logical Argument Mapping is a constructive effort, it creates more than is 
explicitly given in a text or statement, but this construction is guided and constrained by 
a standard that defines what is possible and what is not. In sum, reconstructing argu-
ments as logically valid arguments means being challenged to do it as completely as 
possible and as close to an arguer’s intention as possible. Although there is no guarantee 
of frame-neutrality, the challenge that is posed by the method itself is to make another’s 
argument as strong as possible—realizing thus an imperative for controversial dialogues 
that has been formulated by Thomas Aquinas already hundreds of years ago.
The following considerations are divided into three parts. In the first one, I describe the 
problem more precisely that Logical Argument Mapping is supposed to address, espe-
cially the role of “webs” of mutually supporting beliefs for framing processes. The sec-
ond part tries to clarify the concept of framing by defining boundary setting, sensemak-
ing,  and meaning construction.  The third part,  finally,  introduces  Logical  Argument 
Mapping as a method for analyzing framing processes. As an example of such an analy-
sis, I reconstruct two conflicting arguments on Hamas, the Palestinian organization that 
won the election on January 25 in 2006, and that is listed by the United States and many 
other countries to this date as a terrorist group. 
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The problem
In order to clarify, first of all, the problem space in which I am moving around here, it 
might be useful to start with the distinction between “disagreements” and “controver-
sies” that has been introduced by Schön and Rein with regard to policy disputes. While 
the former “may be settled by reasoned discourse ... in which the parties to contention 
are able to resolve the questions at the heart of their disputes by examining the facts” 
and by “recourse to evidence to which all of the contending parties will agree,” contro-
versies are—according to their terminology—“stubbornly resistant to resolution through 
the exercise of reason” (Schön & Rein, 1994, p. 3). This intractability of controversies 
results  from problems with those “facts” that  are rather  unproblematic  for  disagree-
ments:
“Facts” play a very different role in policy controversies than in policy disagreements.
First, the parties to a controversy employ different strategies of selective attention. De-
pending on their views of the issue, they differ as to what facts are relevant. For exam-
ple, in debates over the alleged decline of the welfare state, political controversies tend 
to focus on data that pertain to economic competitiveness. They argue that welfare ex-
penditures erode the comparative advantage of industrialized countries and undermine 
their ability to compete with Third World industry. Liberals, on the other hand, tend to 
dismiss the ‘can’t afford’ arguments of the conservatives; they focus on data that dem-
onstrate either the need for income support or the inequity of income distribution.
Second, even when the parties to a controversy focus their attention on the same facts, 
they tend to give them different interpretations. For example, a secular trend that shows 
an increase in the proportion of men not working may be seen either as evidence of a 
decrease in opportunities for work or as a deterioration in the will to work. In the War 
on Drugs, a decline in the rate of interdiction of drug-runners at the borders of the 
United States and Mexico may be seen either as a sign of the ineffectiveness of the pol-
icy of interdiction or as evidence that the strategy is functioning as an effective deter-
rent. (Schön & Rein, 1994, pp. 4-5)
But why is the recourse to “facts” problematic in controversies? Why are people selec-
tive in their attention, and why do they interpret differently what they select as relevant? 
And why shouldn’t  it  be easy to overcome those difficulties? Prominent  answers to 
these questions have been suggested in philosophy on the one hand, and social psychol-
ogy on the other. 
In philosophy, Robert Fogelin proposed some time ago a distinction that is similar to 
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Schön and Rein’s distinction between “disagreements” and “controversies,” namely that 
between “normal” argumentative exchange and “deep disagreements.” While “normal” 
exchange  takes  place  “within  a  context  of  broadly shared  beliefs  and 
preferences” (Fogelin, 1985, p. 3), we “get a deep disagreement when the argument is 
generated by a clash of framework propositions” (p. 5). Looking at disputes like those 
over the morality of abortion and affirmative action quotas, Fogelin argues that agree-
ment is only possible when there is “a shared background of beliefs and preferences” (p. 
5). However, if there is “a clash of framework propositions,” no appeal to reasons or 
facts can change people’s minds. Although a rational approach would try “to surface 
these background propositions and then discuss them directly,” experience shows that 
the main problem is that “we do not simply find isolated propositions” at the root of 
deep disagreements, “but instead a whole system of mutually supporting propositions 
(and paradigms, models, styles of acting and thinking) that constitute, if I may use the 
phrase, a form of life” (pp. 5-6). 
Fogelin’s main argument is that “deep disagreements cannot be resolved through the 
use of argument, for they undercut the conditions essential to arguing,” namely first of 
all  the condition that  any argument  must  eventually refer  to a  shared framework of 
background assumptions (p. 5). However, it is less clear what exactly the relevance of 
his considerations on the systemic character of our beliefs is. This point has been clari-
fied by Allen Buchanan in a paper on “social moral epistemology” (Buchanan, 2002). 
Buchanan shows that any “web” of mutually supporting beliefs can easily be defended 
against any sort of evidence to the contrary by ad hoc hypotheses. An ad hoc hypothesis 
is a hypothesis  whose main function is to keep systems of belief  consistent without 
changing core assumptions. The idea and the concept have been developed in philoso-
phy of science to describe the strategies scientists often use to avoid what Thomas Kuhn 
called “paradigm shifts,” that is a “revolution” of systematic bodies of knowledge.1 Bu-
chanan argues that something similar happens all the time when we are facing “a web of 
mutually  supporting  false  beliefs.”  Any  argument  and  evidence  that  counters  one’s 
position can be rejected by ad hoc assumptions that enforce a “systematic exclusion” of 
alternative perspectives. Referring to his own childhood in the racist American South, 
he describes this point as follows:
As a result of this structural inequality, which greatly reduced the chances that whites 
would have experiences that revealed the full mental capacities of blacks, the belief in 
1 Kuhn, 1970 <1962>. The usage of ad hoc hypotheses has nicely been described by Lakatos & Mus-
grave, 1970, p. 100-101.
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the mental inferiority of blacks was deeply entrenched. As a result, when a particular 
black person clearly exhibited extraordinary mental  abilities,  instead of abandoning 
their belief in blacks’ natural inferiority, whites simply appealed to another strand in 
their complex web of racist beliefs: the notion that the presence of some “white blood” 
in a black person could raise him above the low position of blacks generally. Thus, in-
stead of regarding the experience of seeing extraordinary mental abilities in a particular 
black person as disconfirming the universalization that blacks are mentally inferior, 
whites “saved the hypothesis” by assuming that that black person “must have some 
white blood.” (Buchanan, 2002, p. 139-40)
That means, in short, that the framing processes described by Schön and Rein—selec-
tive attention and different interpretations of what gets selected—can be explained by 
the existence of webs of mutually supporting beliefs that are highly dynamic when it 
comes to counterevidence, but absolutely petrified with regard to core assumptions.
In social psychology, Daniel Bar-Tal developed—in an attempt to explain the intracta-
bility of conflicts like those in Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Kashmir, and the Middle 
East—the concept  of  a  “sociopsychological  infrastructure”  that  works  like  “a prism 
through which society members construe their reality, collect new information, interpret 
their experiences, and make decisions about their course of action” (Bar-Tal, 2007, p. 
1430). Simply in order to cope with pain, threats, stress, exhaustion, and costs inflicted 
by an intractable conflict, and in order to withstand the rival, parties on both sides must 
develop a sociopsychological infrastructure that  allows them to form and maintain a 
strong social identity, to develop a sense of differentiation and superiority, and to moti-
vate solidarity,  mobilization,  and action. All this, of course, stabilizes first of all the 
conflict itself and makes it resistant to any change.
While Bar-Tal proposes a rather narrow definition of “intractability” that includes, for 
example, “physical violence in which society members (soldiers and civilians) are killed 
and wounded” (p. 1432), it seems fair to assume that similar sociopsychological mecha-
nisms are relevant in all sorts of conflicts, controversies, and deep disagreements. They 
can explain why it is so hard to change whole systems of belief. It is easier to react to 
challenges to belief systems by means of ad hoc hypotheses than risking one’s own so-
cial and individual identity in a “revolution of thinking” whose outcome and costs—
cognitive and others—are impossible to anticipate.
At this point, however, I would argue that it is a mistake to assume that webs of beliefs 
and sociopsychological infrastructures are relevant only in conflicts and controversies. 
If we assume—following an idea that has been developed in philosophy of science un-
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der the heading of “theory-ladenness of observation” (Hanson, 1972 <1958>)—that any 
cognitive access to something in our environment is  conditioned, and constrained, by 
those conceptual frameworks, theories, beliefs, values, attitudes, models, images, and 
narratives that we have at our disposal in a certain moment, then it is clear that there are 
no “facts” that could simply be taken for granted. Any perception, any understanding of 
something, is at least co-determined by the cognitive means we bring with us, as indi-
viduals as well as as societies and cultures. The task is always to mentally present the 
world around us, and since this world is in flux and full of complexities, interdependen-
cies, and without priorly defined boundaries and structures, any representation is inevi-
tably a reduction and simplification that raises the question: what is an adequate repre-
sentation?
Fogelin’s and Buchanan’s talk about whole “systems,” or “webs,” of mutually support-
ing beliefs  provides  a  good description  of  how those reductions  and simplifications 
work. But these holistic webs and systems are not only relevant for people in controver-
sies; rather, they form the framework of conditions on which any knowledge and any 
understanding whatsoever depends. The point is only that usually there is not much of a 
need to reflect on this fact. Only in conflicts is a reflection on those hidden conditions 
of understanding necessary and useful.
This  epistemological  argument  is  the main  reason for my previously formulated  as-
sumption that framing processes are indeed a universal and inevitable phenomenon. The 
cognitive mechanisms described by Buchanan and Bar-Tal not only stabilize social and 
personal identities, but also help us to cope with any sort of complexity most efficiently; 
efficiently from a cognitive point of view. Since there is no reason to assume that peo-
ple with an academic background are any different from anybody else regarding basic, 
cognitive principles, the crucial message at this point must be that the analyst of a con-
troversy—although equipped with all the tools of her or his discipline—is, in the end, 
no better off than the parties whose framing mechanisms she analyzes.
To sum up these considerations, we can conclude that there are two fundamental prob-
lems when it comes to framing processes. On the level of framing as the subject of our 
analysis, we can see that there are two main reasons that it is so hard to overcome the 
phenomena of selective attention and different interpretations: first, because any percep-
tion of something is determined by webs of mutually supporting beliefs and, second, be-
cause stabilizing those webs as part of a robust sociopsychological infrastructure is sim-
ply efficient from a cognitive point of view. And on the level of framing as a process in 
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which we ourselves are involved as analysts, we have to acknowledge that we are sub-
ject to the same mechanisms we try to describe and manage; there is no frame-neutrali-
ty. And this again means that we need specific methods to cope with this fact.
Boundary setting, meaning construction, and sensemaking
It is easy to see that what Schön and Rein discuss as “selective attention” can be con-
nected to what I dubbed “boundary setting,” a term that refers to what C. West Church-
man (1979) called “boundary judgments.” A discussion of this concept recently played 
a significant role in so-called “critical systems thinking” in management and organiza-
tion theory. As Flood (1999) describes it, the starting point of critical systemic thinking 
in the sense of Churchman is the insight “that the human mind is not able to know the 
whole, ... that every worldview is terribly restricted” (p. 252). One important implica-
tion of this limitation has been illuminated by Werner Ulrich as follows: 
No argument can be completely rational in the sense of justifying all the assumptions 
on which it depends as well as all the consequences it may have. What ought to count 
as knowledge, that is, as relevant circumstances, ‘facts’ and ‘evidence’ that should be 
considered? And what counts as relevant concerns, that is, value judgments concerning 
purposes, measures of success and other criteria of evaluation (‘norms’)? Whose facts 
and whose concerns should they represent? Ultimately, there is no single right way to 
decide such questions. Yet at some point argumentation has to end and practical action 
has to begin.  Boundary judgments define the boundaries of argumentation.  (Ulrich, 
2001, p. 91; see also Ulrich, 2003)
While the term boundary “judgment” seems to presuppose explicit statements and con-
siderations on how to define those boundaries, “boundary setting”—as I use the term—
can also be performed implicitly simply by talking only about a selection of things. I 
would propose the following
Definition of “boundary setting”:
Boundary setting is the process of producing signs in a way that the entirety 
of the signs used in a certain situation indicates which issues, facts, values, 
norms, concerns, involved people, etc. are within the sign user’s horizon of 
awareness and which are outside.
While the concept of boundary setting allows us to reflect on mechanisms of inclusion 
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and exclusion, the concept of “meaning construction” provides a means to reflect on the 
fact that everything that is within the boundaries of our awareness can itself be inter-
preted by completely different reference systems. Gregory Bateson (1972 <1955>) in-
troduced the example of two monkeys he observed in the zoo biting each other. Al-
though this biting was similar to what can be observed in real fights, it was obvious to 
him that what was happening was only play. He concluded that even animals are able to 
engage in what he called “meta-communication.” They exchange signs that allow them 
to distinguish whether a biting has to be framed as play or as serious fight (p. 179). We 
can observe processes of meaning construction only if people produce certain signs that 
indicate how they interpret an issue, and how they want others to interpret this issue. 
Based on this consideration, I would define “meaning construction” as follows.
Definition of “meaning construction”:
Meaning construction is the process of producing signs in a way that the en-
tirety of those signs indicate a reference systems (i.e. a “frame”) that deter-
mines the way somebody interprets something (data, things, other signs and 
the signs used, people, events, actions, developments, etc.). The signs pro-
duced can be language-related signs, but also mimics, gestures, voice modu-
lation,  body  language,  dressing,  and  things  like  diagrams,  maps,  charts, 
etc.).
This definition builds on a similar definition proposed by Barbara Gray:
Framing refers to the process of constructing and representing our interpretations of the 
world around us. We construct frames by sorting and categorizing our experience—
weighing new information against our previous interpretations. (Gray, 2003, p. 12).
While Gray focuses on framing from the first person perspective—without, as it seems, 
making a clear distinction between a constructive and a cognitive side of framing—my 
definition is formulated from an observer’s point of view. For this perspective it is cru-
cial that identifying and analyzing processes of meaning construction depend heavily on 
hypotheses and guesses. We cannot see how somebody “interprets” something; the only 
thing we can see is what we interpret as signs for a certain way of constructing mean-
ing. The “entirety” of signs I am referring to is, of course, always relative to our capaci-
ties—and time—to observe those signs.
Constructing meaning is important, on the one hand, for parties to a conflict who use 
framing strategically, “aiming to persuade others to our point of view, gain advantage in 
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negotiations, and rally like-minded people to our causes” (Shmueli, Elliott, & Kaufman, 
2006, p. 209). On the other hand, it is a central instrument for  conflict management. 
Thus, Gray (2006) argues for framing as a “mediation technique. ... The mediator’s role 
is to help frame the conflict and its potential resolution in a way that all parties perceive 
to be fair” (cf. Drake & Donohue, 1996, p. 314; Dewulf et al., 2005, p. 3). 
While my definitions of “meaning construction” and “boundary setting” stress the ex-
pressive side of what happens in communication and interaction—both are defined as 
semiotic processes—there is of course also an underlying cognitive process that deter-
mines how we set boundaries in concrete situations, and how we construct the meaning 
of what is within those boundaries. I call this cognitive process “sensemaking”:
Definition of “sensemaking” and further involved concepts:
Sensemaking is the process of interpreting data in a way that they fit into a 
belief-value-attitude system. “Data” can be externally observable signs, peo-
ple, things, events, etc., but also ideas or thoughts. A “belief-value-attitude 
system” is a web of beliefs, values, and attitudes that is consistent from its 
bearer’s point of view. A “belief” is defined here as that cognitive state we 
are in whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true, im-
plicitly or explicitly; thus, a belief is representable in the form of a factual 
or conditional statement. “Values” are defined as behavior guiding beliefs 
that are based on principles, needs, interests, or preferences. “Attitudes” are 
emotions someone feels with regard to certain data. The “fit” of data into a 
belief-value-attitude system can be achieved in three different ways: (a) by 
constraining the data (neglecting what is incomprehensible, or interpreting it 
in a way that it does fit); (b) by changing the system; or (c) by a mixture of 
(a) and (b).
This definition relates my discussion of webs of mutually supporting beliefs in the first 
section of this chapter to “framing as sensemaking” as discussed recently by Deborah 
Shmueli, Michael Elliott, and Sanda Kaufman. They describe how frames are used as
... cognitive devices or shortcuts for making sense of complex information ... These 
cognitive structures help reduce information overload and operate as models of reality 
that, by necessity, trade detail for clarity. Frames organize phenomena into coherent, 
understandable categories, giving meaning to some observed aspects while discounting 
others  that  appear  irrelevant  or  counterintuitive.  This  selective simplification  filters 
people’s perceptions and defines their fields of vision. It can lead to sharply divergent 
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interpretations of an event. (Shmueli et al., 2006, p. 208)
The important point is that while sensemaking refers to understanding and interpreting 
in my terminology, meaning construction refers to expression and sign production. The 
three  definitions  I  am proposing here  to  distinguish  different  meanings  of  the  term 
“framing” are supposed to fulfill various functions:
1. They allow a distinction between  semiotic and  cognitive  processes of framing. 
This is important because it is possible to construct meanings and set boundaries 
in deliberate contrast to what we really think about an issue. We can use semiot-
ic framing strategically, or we can lie about something, or simply frame an issue 
according to conventions that are determined by cultural standards like polite-
ness. Sensemaking as a cognitive process, by contrast, is always determined by a 
need for consistency, even if we do not necessarily know whether our belief-val-
ue-attitude system is consistent or not.
2. Based on the distinction between semiotic and cognitive framing we can say that 
while it  is possible  to make sense of something without expressing anything 
about it, any boundary setting and meaning construction depends on sensemak-
ing. Therefore, while sensemaking might be independent of the semiotic pro-
cesses, the semiotic processes are not independent of their cognitive foundation.
3. Two elements of the definition of sensemaking allow us to explain concrete cas-
es of boundary setting and meaning construction: first, that whatever we observe 
or communicate gets to be interpreted by means of a certain belief-value-attitude 
system and, second, that the process of interpreting and integrating data is driven 
by efforts to keep the whole thing consistent—or at least to avoid obvious con-
tradictions.
4. The distinction between the two semiotic processes of framing on the one hand 
and sensemaking on the other is necessary for the analysis of framing processes 
from an observer’s point of view. Since we can never directly observe how peo-
ple interpret what is going on in their environment, any analysis depends on the 
signs people use in boundary setting and meaning construction. Only signs are 
directly observable, although their meaning depends necessarily on interpreta-
tion. That means, when we try to reconstruct cognitive sensemaking processes, 
we are dependent on semiotic processes as proxies.
5. The distinction between boundary setting and meaning construction is important 
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because it makes a difference whether we simply do not talk about certain things 
or interpret what we are talking about in a certain way.
Logical Argument Mapping
Allen Buchanan in the article discussed above stresses that, in a situation where webs of 
mutually  supporting beliefs  are  defended by  ad hoc hypotheses,  there  is  no way to 
change things when we try to refute one point after the other without “attacking a large 
set of mutually supporting beliefs” as a whole (Buchanan, 2002, p. 140). However, the 
possibility of doing so depends on our ability to represent, first of all, such a web as a 
whole. Just this is the main function of Logical Argument Mapping (LAM), the method 
I  want  to  propose here for  the  analysis  of  framing processes  as  they are  visible  in 
boundary setting and meaning construction.
A second function is that  visualizing what we think as analysts about a web of beliefs 
helps us to clarify our own thinking process. In Logical Argument Mapping we enter a 
kind of dialectical process that leads us back and forth between improving our own un-
derstanding of the material and revealing the limits of the material’s rationality. The sig-
nificance of visualizations for cognitive processes has been stressed by many in the 
field of argument mapping.  The idea goes back to Charles Peirce’s concept of “dia-
grammatic reasoning” (Hoffmann, 2004, 2007b), but it got real momentum when soft-
ware tools became available for things like “dialog mapping” (Conklin, 2006), “argu-
ment  visualization” (Kirschner,  Buckingham Shum, & Carr,  2003),  and “knowledge 
cartography” (Okada, Buckingham Shum, & Sherborne, 2008). 
The decisive difference between Logical Argument Mapping and the majority of tools 
developed in these fields is that LAM demands logical validity as a normative standard 
for the construction of arguments (see Hoffmann, 2007a). This is supposed to fulfill the 
method’s third function: The rules,  conventions and procedure of Logical Argument 
Mapping are defined in a way that the user is permanently challenged to reflect on how 
to improve her or his construction or reconstruction of an argument in order to meet this 
standard (as discussed more extensively at the end of the introduction, above).
Three simple rules define the normative standard of LAM: (1.) structure your map ac-
cording to an argument scheme whose logical validity is evident and generally accepted 
(e.g.,  modus ponens, modus tollens, disjunctive syllogism, conditional syllogism, etc., 
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but also argument schemes that are transformed from invalid ones into valid ones like 
complete induction, argument from perfect authority, and argument from perfect analo-
gy); (2.) make sure that all your premises are true, and provide further arguments for 
their truth if it is not evident; and (3.) make sure that all your premises are consistent 
with each other.
The details of the method are described elsewhere.2 In this chapter, I will concentrate on 
an exemplary analysis of two conflicting framing processes. The objective is to demon-
strate how the method can be applied; it will be described only so far as it is necessary 
to understand the outcome, the argument maps below. These maps represent two arti-
cles that were published after Hamas won the Palestinian elections on January 25, 2006. 
The broader horizon of both articles is, roughly, the question of how the international 
community should deal with Hamas. I do not have any intention to decide who is right 
and who is wrong in this controversy, and I am not interested to reflect any further con-
siderations that should be discussed to decide this question, or to get a more appropriate 
picture of the problem—although it should be clear, based on the problem of frame-neu-
trality discussed above, that I cannot exclude being biased myself either. The selection 
of both articles is more or less arbitrary; I found them (in March 2007) by searching the 
most recent publications on Hamas that are listed in the “Web of Science” database that 
provides web access to three ISI databases: Science Citation Index Expanded, Social 
Sciences Citation Index, and Arts & Humanities Search. Based on the selection criteria 
of these databases and the journals they cover,  the scientific quality of both articles 
shouldn’t be a concern.
Shortly after the elections, in the March-April issue of Foreign Affairs, Michael Herzog 
published an article titled “Can Hamas be tamed?” (Herzog, 2006). A short biographical 
info at the end of the article describes the author as 
a Brigadier General in the Israel Defense Forces and a Visiting Fellow at the Washing-
ton Institute for Near East Policy. He was formerly the senior military aide to Israel’s 
Minister of Defense and the head of strategic planning for the IDF. 
The second article was published by Khaled Hroub a few months later in the summer 
2006 issue of Journal of Palestine Studies under the heading “A ‘new Hamas’ through 
its new documents” (Hroub, 2006). As a short note says, Khaled Hroub, “a leading ex-
pert on Hamas, is the author of Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (IPS, 2000) and 
2 A manual that provides—besides descriptions of the rules, conventions, and the procedure—lists of 
logically valid argument schemes, and also some conflict schemes to represent objections, is available 
at http://www.prism.gatech.edu/~mh327/LAM. 
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Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide (forthcoming from Pluto Press, 2006)” (p. 6).
The first step in a LAM analysis is to identify the central claim of a position, and to for-
mulate this claim as the conclusion of an argument. Since the understanding of an argu-
ment is facilitated when we know the central claim from the very beginning, and based 
on Western reading habits, this claim is always located on top of the map in the left cor-
ner.3 Starting with Herzog’s article, a first analysis could result in the map in Figure 1. 
Crucial here is, first, that the long quotes on the right side are summarized in a short for-
mulation of his main reason and, second, that—in order to transform the simple argu-
ment in the first line into a logically valid one—a “warrant” has been constructed ac-
cording to the valid argument scheme which is traditionally called  modus ponens.  A 
“warrant” is defined in LAM as a statement that is sufficient to justify the step from a 
reason to a claim. That means, the warrant must be formulated in a way that—given the 
truth of both this warrant and the reason—the conclusion must be necessarily true. That 
3 There is a further reason for this layout-decision. The goal to visualize entire webs of mutually sup-
porting beliefs in an ongoing process can only be realized if there is an “open space” for doing this. 
Since in cmap, the software I am using here, only the top left corner of the available space is deter-
mined, and since we are working from the conclusion backwards, this should be the starting point.
Figure  1:  The  central  argument  of  Herzog  (2006);  all  maps  are  created  with  IHMC  Cmap  tools:  
http://cmap.ihmc.us/)
18
this is the case in a modus ponens argument can easily be seen if we look at its symbol-
ized form (p and q represent simple statements): if p, then q; p; therefore, q. 
Explicating the warrant is the most important step in LAM for three reasons: First, since 
nobody would provide a certain reason without assuming at least implicitly that this rea-
son is sufficient to justify a claim, and since such a justification is usually not explicitly 
stated—mainly based on its repetitive character—the formulation of the warrant reveals 
an important part of the arguer’s implicit web of beliefs. Second, this warrant must be 
explicitly stated in order to scrutinize the argument’s  soundness—which is defined by 
two criteria: the argument must be logically valid and all the premises must be true (for 
validity the truth is only  presupposed,  but not actually defended); we can check the 
soundness of an argument only if everything that is relevant for it is visible. And third, 
visualizing an argument in its strongest possible form—that is, as a  valid argument—
puts everything on the table that must be defended by further arguments if it is contro-
versial. This last point will lead the analyst—or the constructor of an argument—from 
presenting a simple argument to constructing an entire argumentation, that is a web of 
mutually supporting arguments. This way, Logical Argument Mapping is expected to 
reveal the inferential structure of an entire web of beliefs as it is relevant for a certain 
position in a certain situation.
Based on their importance, the warrants are highlighted in LAM by putting them into 
oval text boxes. Another convention for constructing maps is to indicate the argument  
scheme (“ArgScheme”) that is used in each case. This is important as a reminder that ar-
gument schemes can always be replaced by alternative schemes. Since the concrete for-
mulation of the warrant and all the other statements depends on the chosen argument 
scheme, the selection of the most appropriate scheme is a creative act that one might 
want to correct when it turns out that an argument is hard to defend.
The further analysis of Herzog’s argumentation shows that he does not see a need to de-
fend the reason of his argument (“Hamas is an Islamist movement that propagates vio-
lence”); however, it seems to be necessary for him to defend what I reconstructed as his 
warrant. His strategy at this point is to formulate possible objections against this war-
rant,  and to  refute  these objections  by further  arguments  (Figure 2).  This  refutation 
again leads him to a reformulation of his original argument, and a refinement that expli-
cates what he thinks the international community should do (Figure 3).
Mapping Herzog’s argument in this way reveals that there are two potential weaknesses 
an opponent could criticize. First, the argument that is reconstructed as a “complete in-
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Figure 2: Refuting objections against the warrant in Figure 1
20
duction” in Figure 3—although a valid one—is not necessarily a sound one. What can 
be criticized is the warrant. A set of only four examples cannot exclude the possibility 
that the situation is different in this case. Second, while the warrant in the disjunctive 
syllogism in the left corner at the bottom is convincing—there are only two possibilities 
to create those conditions, either from the inside or from the outside—there should be 
Figure 3: Herzog’s refinement and extension of his central argument (cf. Figure 1). The conclusion at the  
top left is what he calls “the most important lesson” that he draws from his detailed “comparative analy-
sis” that is mentioned in Figure 2, and here copied as the reason for this argument.
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some further support for the reason in this argument. It is possible that Hamas itself cre-
ates the conditions that are listed in the middle of Figure 3, or that they are at least inter-
ested in forming the political stability which is central for those conditions.
Figure 4: The argument of Hroub (2006), including an implication of his conclusion that would be rele-
vant for the question of how Hamas should be treated by the international community (the lower left side 
box).
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Hroub’s article, by contrast, focuses on only one central argument (Figure 4). The lon-
gest part of his article consists of a detailed analysis of the documents that are men-
tioned in his main reason (top right corner in Figure 4). In this chapter, I present only 
his analysis of the first of these documents which contains a discussion of an alternative 
reading of this text (Figure 5). Similar to Herzog, also Hroub feels a need to defend his 
central warrant by considering, and rejecting, a possible objection (Figure 4).
A critic of Hroub’s argumentation could highlight, first, that his attempt to refute the 
objection against this warrant—all these documents might be part of “a ploy to gain 
Figure 5: Hroub’s discussion of references to violence and Islam in Hamas’ 2005 “Electoral Platform 
for Change and Reform.” In the complete map, this part of his argumentation supports the “reason” in  
Figure 4 (top right corner).
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power by concealing true agendas”—only repeats what he says in his central reason; his 
refutation does not provide anything new. Second, it could be questioned whether his 
central warrant is really true. The situation is here similar to Herzog’s complete induc-
tion, and it might indeed have been better to reconstruct this argument in the form of a 
complete induction: The fact, that some documents indicate a shift in Hamas’s position, 
does not necessarily imply that there is indeed such a shift.
Discussion
Logical Argument Mapping allows us to represent extensive discussions in a way that 
their  central  argumentative  structure  becomes  visible  at  a  glance.  Hroub’s  article  is 
about twenty pages, and Herzog’s about ten. The maps, however, summarize and sharp-
en their arguments, and they reveal at which points the arguments fall short of leading 
to  necessary conclusions. A conclusion is necessary only if the argument is logically 
valid and all the premises are true. Since LAM’s normative standard challenges us to 
use  only valid argument schemes, we often have to formulate parts of an argument—
mostly the warrant—stronger than intended by the author. By criticizing then the truth 
of the argument’s reconstructed premises (reasons and warrants), we can highlight the 
discrepancy between what an author provides and the goal of getting a necessary con-
clusion. 
More important, however, is the fact that the maps reveal the essence of the framing 
processes authors perform when developing their position. What becomes visible are 
the webs of mutually supporting beliefs that seem to underlie the sensemaking process-
es that determine the authors’ interpretations of what happens, and what the relevant 
facts are. 
Sensemaking itself, as mentioned above, cannot be visible because it is defined here as 
a cognitive process. What is visible, however, are the semiotic processes of boundary 
setting and meaning construction. Although it might be different in specific situations, if 
we assume that these semiotic processes represent adequately underlying thinking pro-
cesses, it is clear that boundary setting and meaning construction on one hand and sen-
semaking on the other cannot be different  forms of framing that could exist indepen-
dently of each other, but that both are different  aspects—internal versus external—of 
the same process. Their terminological differentiation, however, is important because it 
is possible,  and sometimes even necessary,  that  semiotic and cognitive processes go 
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their own ways—for example, when a negotiator frames an issue deliberately in a cer-
tain way.
The distinction between boundary setting and meaning construction, on the other side, 
is also important, and with regard to this distinction it is indeed adequate to talk about 
different forms of framing because both processes can occur independently of each oth-
er. If we look at the maps that represent Herzog’s and Hroub’s argumentations, we can 
see that they differ with regard to both. Regarding the boundaries by which they define 
their subject, the main difference is that Hroub includes into his boundaries a thorough 
analysis of documents produced by Hamas in the years 2005 and 2006, while we find 
within Herzog’s boundaries a detailed comparison of the Hamas case with the coopta-
tion of Islamists in other countries, and the formulation of “conditions” that must be ful-
filled for successful cooptation. Important is also that only within Herzog’s boundaries 
we find things like the quotes from interviews with Mahmoud al-Zahar, “the group’s 
leading  figure,”  which  would  contradict  Hroub’s  point  that  there  is  an evolution  in 
Hamas’s thinking (Figure 2). All this shows that both authors try to set the agenda of 
the discussion by setting the boundaries around the issue in very specific ways.
Looking at these examples we can say that boundary setting is not only a mechanism of 
exclusion and inclusion, but also a process through which something like a “center of 
gravity” gets defined. While Hroub’s considerations center around an “evolution” of 
Hamas that should be supported from the outside, Herzog’s main point is to get things 
into the right order: first creating the conditions, then cooptation. 
Although it seems to be easy to create by means of boundary setting simply two differ-
ent “worlds” without any connection, it is interesting and important that both authors 
are discussing issues—at the “margins” of their “worlds,” so to speak—that could form 
something like a “common ground.” There is an area that is within the boundaries of 
both approaches. However, crucial  with regard to those areas is the observation that 
what looks like parts of a common ground is sharply divided by means of the second 
form of framing that must be distinguished here: meaning construction. Both authors, 
for example, talk about Hamas’s 1988 charter. But while Herzog frames this document 
as representing an “ideology ... which remains operative to this day,” Hroub stresses 
that the charter was “drawn up less than a year after the movement was established in 
direct response to the outbreak of the first intifada and when its raison d’être was armed 
resistance to the occupation” (p. 7). Similarly, Herzog does not neglect the existence of 
“various statements by Hamas leaders that exhibit flexibility,” and he acknowledges at 
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some point that these could be read as signs of “evolution”; but the  meaning  he con-
structs for those signs is determined by the immediately following hint at “overwhelm-
ing evidence pointing in the opposite direction” (Figure 2, right side).
While these examples show that Logical Argument Mapping should be a useful tool for 
the analysis of boundary setting and meaning construction as the two forms of semiotic 
framing that I distinguished in this article, I also want to hint at some limitations of this 
approach. The first one is obviously that the method can only be applied when people 
are indeed  arguing for their positions, when they provide reasons for their claims, or 
justifying what they say. Especially in verbal interaction, the amount of these compo-
nents of communication is often pretty small, unfortunately. A second limitation con-
cerns the argumentative quality of the material we try to analyze. Experience shows, for 
example, that when a text is simply badly written so that it is even hard to identify what 
exactly the conclusion of an argument  might  be, or the reasons, a reconstruction by 
means of Logical Argument Mapping can only provide a hypothesis regarding ongoing 
framing processes.
Conclusion
The main objective of this chapter was to present Logical Argument Mapping (LAM) as 
a method to analyze framing processes; a method that is especially designed to cope, 
first,  with the problem that the cognitive side of framing, sensemaking, confronts us 
with the need to reflect on entire systems of mutually supporting beliefs, values, and at-
titudes and, second, to cope with the fact that there is no frame-neutrality, that is: the 
analyst of framing processes has to deal with the fundamental problem that her or his 
work is determined by the very same mechanisms of framing that she or he tries to ana-
lyze. 
With regard to the first problem, using LAM means that we are able to visualize the in-
ferential structure between those assumptions and references to facts that are essential 
for a position; LAM opens up a space in which webs of mutually supporting beliefs can 
be represented, studied, criticized, and supported by further arguments. And with regard 
to the problem of missing frame-neutrality,  Logical Argument Mapping establishes a 
standard of argumentation that is—at least regarding its formal structure—independent 
of personal judgments and points of view; the normative standard of logical validity 
guides us in reconstructing everything we need—including an arguer’s implicit assump-
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tions—to represent a position as a consistent position, and that means: as strong as pos-
sible.
The main advantage of using Logical Argument Mapping as an analytical tool might be 
that  it  stimulates  self-reflexivity and self-criticism.  We have to  see as a whole how 
somebody frames an issue, and what her or his implicit assumptions are, and we have to 
try very consciously to meet the standard of consistency in reconstructing a position, in 
order to be able to improve our own perception of what is going on. 
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